460 APPENDIX. 



Experience had taught our soldiers that their success and safety depended 

 not less on the quality of their horses, than on the superiority of their cou- 

 rage ; and though they did not murmur, they universally desponded of suc- 

 cess, and considered themselves as marching to deliver themselves into the 

 hands of their enemies, — victims, without the means of offering any resistance. 



A friend of Carrera's in San Juan had sent 400 horses to a potrera in the 

 vicinity of Pie de Palo, and a letter to Carrera, directing him where he 

 should march to take those horses ; and also informing him, that the town 

 was entirely in our favour ; and that 300 of the veteran infantry, which had 

 belonged to No. 1. regiment, were ready to pass to us soon as we should 

 attack the plaza. This letter was unfortunately intercepted by the enemy, 

 who took the necessary measures for their security, possessed themselves of 

 the horses alluded to, and put into prison all suspected persons. 



A party of thirty men, the best mounted of our division, were advanced 

 to Guanacacho, to take whatever horses they might find there and observe the 

 Mendocinos. Another party marched a considerable distance in our rear, 

 to ascertain if the San-Juaninos retired to San Juan or followed our march. 

 We marched but a few leagues that day, and were obliged to halt in a 

 medano, or soft sandy ground, without either grass or water ; the incapacity 

 of our horses not admitting our farther advance to a more desirable situation. 



Our advanced party met a strong detachment of the enemy in Guanacacho; 

 they were in a potrera, and, not being able to escape out it, they were nearly 

 all cut off: — a few escaped to Mendoza with the news. 



By a priest whom we had taken, and who was a scout of the enemy, we 

 knew that the Mendocinos were near at hand. An express was sent to 

 Guanacacho, requiring the party to fall back rapidly with whatever horses 

 they had taken, that they might unite themselves with us ; and orders of a 

 similar nature were sent to the rear-guard ; but in the next moment we dis- 

 covered the enemy, who had taken up a strong position between us and our 

 advanced party, thereby cutting off all communications. 



Thus we found ourselves in front of the enemy, our best mounted and 

 bravest soldiers absent, and our men entirely destitute of that animation and 

 desire for combat which they so strongly manifested on all former occasions; 

 some soldiers mounted on worthless horses, more on mules, and others lead- 

 ing their horses after them on foot. Such were our dreary prospects on the 

 morning of the 31st August, 1821. 



Under these disadvantages the General did not despair, but made immediate 



