ARISTOTLE 



" Internal 

 finality " : 

 btitmoditied 

 in various 

 ways : 

 (a) perpetu- 

 ation of 

 species ; 



(b) human 

 societies ; 



mined by the nature of the product which is to result 

 from it, not the other way round : things yiyveTai. as 

 they do because they are what they are." We are 

 therefore justified in describing Aristotle's outlook as 

 " teleological " ; but we must not read too much into 

 this description. " Nature does nothing without a 

 purpose " ; but if we ask what that purpose is, we may 

 find that the answer is not quite what we had expected, 

 that the purpose is not so grand as we had hoped. 

 Aristotle seems to be satisfied when the reXos has been 

 realized in each individual's full development ; and this 

 is because for him Form is not normally independent of 

 Matter (as it is for Plato) ; Form must be embodied in 

 matter, that is, in individuals. Each complete and 

 perfect embodiment and realization of Form in Matter 

 is therefore for him the crowning achievement of the 

 efforts of the four Causes — it is the End towards which 

 they were directed. We might, then, describe this 

 " teleology " in Bergson's phrase as a doctrine of 

 " internal finality " : each individual is " complete " 

 in itself.* Aristotle does, however, maintain that the 

 " most natural " thing for an animal to do is to pro- 

 duce another one like itself, and hence the species is 

 implicated in so far as it is the individual's business 

 to perpetuate it (see App. A §§ 15 ff.). We must 

 also remember that the continuity of yeVeaiy, one de- 

 partment of which is the continuous succession of 

 generations of animals, is, for Aristotle, " necessary " 

 (App. A § 14) ; and it is also part of the general 

 purpose of " God," who always aims at " the better," 

 and who, because he was unable to fill the whole 

 universe from circumference to centre with eternal 

 " being," filled up the central region of it with the 

 next best available, viz., continuous yevems. " In another 

 connexion, too, in the Ethics, we find that Aristotle 

 looks further than the individual, at any rate so far as 

 man is concerned, for there he tells us that man 

 cannot attain his reAoj in the fullest sense — the " good 

 life "—except in association (to avC'fjv) with other men 



xl 



» Cf. quotation from Dante, Paradiso xx. 78, on p. 1, 



" Cf. § 16. 



« For further details see App. A § 12. 



