GENERATION OF ANIMALS 



in a TToAi?. But this seems to be due exclusively to 

 the fact that man possesses Reason : and so far as 

 other animals are concerned, Aristotle does not appear 

 to have envisaged any such widening of the reXos." 

 From yet another point of view, however, when discuss- (e) sub- 

 ing the subject of property- and household management ordination 

 at the beginning of the Politics {1256 b 15), Aristotle of animals 

 says that just as Nature provides sustenance for animals 

 from the verj' beginning of their existence in the larva, 

 in the egg, or in the uterus, so we mu^t hold that after 

 birth as well Xature provides plants for the sake of 

 animals, and also that she provides animals other than 

 man for the sake of men, for food and service. And if 

 we are right in holding that Nature makes nothing 

 without a purpose (dTtAeV) or pointlessly, we must of 

 necessity say that " Nature has made all the animals 

 for the sake of men." 

 (6) As Aristotle says at the beginning of G.A. I, the two Grouping of 

 Causes with which he is chiefly concerned in this treatise the Causes. 

 are (1) the Motive (or Efficient) Cause, with which he 

 had not dealt in P. A., and (2) the Material Cause. In 

 zoology, of course, the Material Cause is represented by 

 the " parts " of the body of an animal, and all of these 

 except the generative " parts " * he had dealt with in 

 P. A. ; hence in G.A. the Material Cause is represented 

 chiefly by the parts concerned in generation — those, in 

 fact, through which and upon which the Motive Cause 

 operates. At the beginning of Books II and V and at 

 the end of Book V we have further discussions about 

 Causes, and here we find these two Causes identified 

 with " that which is of necessity " (e^ dvdyiajs) ; while Necessity 

 on the other side and contrasted with them is the Final versus the 

 Cause (the Cause " for the sake of which "), which is Better, 

 equated with to /SeAriov or rdyadov {rf. Met. A 

 983 a 33, etc.). Indeed, this contrast of Necessity- and 

 the Better is continually confronting us throughout the 

 G.^1. For instance (717 a 15 fl^.), whatever Nature does 

 or makes is done or made either 8ta to dvayKmov or Sta 

 TO PeXriov ; one or other of these will account for every 



" Perhaps Aristotle would have been willing to include Bees, which 

 possess some " di\-ine " ingredient (see 761 a 5). 



* It should be remembered that " parts " includes semen, milk, etc 

 See §§ 18 ff. 



xU 



