APPENDIX A 



animals. Although rain entails cloud, and cloud rain, 

 in a continuous cycle, your father's yei-eaig does not 

 necessarily entail yours, though yours entails his. But 

 fundamentally the situation is the same in lioth cases, 

 for (a) yeveais and (f>6opd shall never fail (§§ 12 and 14); 

 there must always be a yeVo? of men, animals and plants 

 {G.A. II), and the race will be continued even if one 

 particular individual does not reproduce itself (this at 

 any rate seems to be implied by Aristotle) ; (6) in 

 neither case is there persistent identity of the individual : 

 just as j'ou are different dpiBfiw from your grandfather, 

 so is the rain which falls to-day different dpidyiu) from 

 the rain which fell yesterday or last year. 



(17) De anima II. 415 a 25 ff. Reproduction is one of the r«'v«<ris by 

 functions of dpiTmicfi ipvxrj (nutritive Soul ; see Introd. reproduc- 

 §§ 41 ff.) ; and the " most natural " function of all living ^"^^"^ ^^ 

 things is to produce another one like themselves " so attaining 

 that they may partake in the eternal and divine in the eternity. 

 way that they can " {'va rov dd koL tov deiov fierexoiaiv 3 

 Svvam-ai), since all things strive after this, and for the 



sake of this they do all that they do Kara. <f>vaiv. But 

 they are unable to partake in the eternal and divine by 

 uninterrupted continuance (awexfla), because no thing 

 that is <f)daprr6v may persist as one and the same dpiBtiw ; 

 hence they partake in it each in the way in which they 

 can do so, some more, some less ; and so the thing 

 persists not as itself but as something like itself {ovk 

 avTO oAA' otov avTo) — i.e., as one, not dpiQp.u>, but etSet. 



(18) Aristotle states more than once that the " matter " for The 

 "perishable" things is to hwarov elvcu kox fir) etvai. "matter" 

 E.g., (1) in G. (^- C. II. 335 a 24 ff. For things which 014^0^6. 

 are etvai koL ij.t] elvai bward, the " material cause " 



(oTtioi' ws vXt]) is TO SwoTov eivoi Koi fj.r) etvat, which = 

 TO y€VT)T6v Kol ^OopTov. (Thls Is t^vlcc stated.) Hence, 

 the held in which yiveais and <f)dopd take place must 

 be TO hwaTov elvoL Kal fti] elvai : that, then, is their 

 " material " cause. Their " final " cause is their figure 

 or " form " ; and there is a third cause or dpxq, viz., 

 the " motive " cause. (2) In Met. Z 1032 a 15 ff. we 

 read that ovaiai par excellence, the things which " we 

 consider to have the fullest title to be called oucjiat," are 

 animals and plants. And all (f>va€i. yiyvofjuva (as well, 



575 



