10 INTRODUCTION. 



able pattern of the probable facts of insect psychology. 

 Just as the theologians tell us — and logically enough — 

 that if there is a Divine Mind, the best, and indeed only, 

 conception we can form of it is that which is formed on 

 the analogy, however imperfect, supplied by the human 

 mind; so with * inverted anthropomorphism' we must 

 apply a similar consideration with a similar conclusion to 

 the animal mind. The mental states of an insect may 

 be widely different from those of a man, and yet most 

 probably the nearest conception that we can form of their 

 true nature is that which we form by assimilating them 

 to the pattern of the only mental states with which we 

 are actually acquainted. And this consideration, it is 

 needless to point out, has a special validity to the evo- 

 lutionist, inasmuch as upon his theory there must be a 

 psychological, no less than a physiological, continuity 

 extending throughout the length and breadth of the 

 animal kingdom. 



In these preliminary remarks only one other point 

 requires brief consideration, and this has reference to the 

 distinction between what in popular phraseology is called 

 ^Instinct' and 'Keason.' I shall not here enter upon 

 any elaborate analysis of a distinction which is un- 

 doubtedly valid, but shall confine my remarks to ex- 

 plaining the sense in which I shall everywhere use these 

 terms. 



Few words in our language have been subject to a 

 greater variety of meanings than the word instinct. In 

 popular phraseology, descended from the Middle Ages, 

 -all the mental faculties of the animal are termed in- 

 stinctive, in contradistinction to those of man, which 

 are termed rational. But unless we commit ourselves to 

 an obvious reasoning in a circle, we must avoid assuming 

 that all actions of animals are instinctive, and then 

 arguing that because they are instinctive, therefore they 

 differ from the rational actions of man. The question 

 really lies in what is here assumed, and we can only 

 answer it by examining in what essential respect instinct 

 -differs from reason. 



