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CHAPTEK IX. 



MENTAL PKOCESSES IN ANIMALS I THEIR POWERS OF PERCEPTION 

 AND INTELLIGENCE. 



Two things I have been especially anxious to bring out 

 prominently in the foregoing chapter : first, that the 

 world we see around us is a joint product of two factors 

 — the outward existence, on the one hand, and our active 

 mind on the other; and secondly, that our mental pro- 

 cesses and products fall under two categories — on the one 

 hand, perception, giving rise to percepts, perceptual 

 inferences, and intelligence, and on the other, conception 

 (involving the analysis of phenomena), giving rise to con- 

 cepts, conceptual inferences, and reason. 



Now, I am anxious that the former — to take that first — 

 should be laid hold of and really grasped as an indubitable 

 fact. It is implied in the word " phenomena," that is to say, 

 appearances. We can only know the world as it appears 

 to us ; and the world is for us what it appears. There is 

 nothing here in conflict with common sense ; the practical 

 reality of phenomena is altered no whit. Suppose philosophy 

 tries to get behind phenomena, so as to get a peep at the 

 world beyond. Suppose Carlyle tells us that " All visible 

 things are emblems ; what thou seest is not there on its 

 own account ; strictly taken, is not there [as such] at all ; 

 matter exists only spiritually, and to represent some idea 

 and body it forth." Has he altered the reality of the 

 phenomena themselves ? Not in the smallest degree. 

 Suppose the materialist gives us his analysis of pheno- 

 mena. Are not the phenomena he analyzes still the same, 

 still equally real ? No matter how far he analyzes pheno- 



