Appetence and Emotion. 403 



give expression to his feelings in barks, whines, and yelp- 

 ings. To howl at every little pain would do a wolf no 

 good, but rather advertise him to his enemies; to howl 

 when slightly hurt through inadvertence is of service to the 

 dog, since his master will probably pet the sufferer for his 

 pains. In the one case, to howl is disadvantageous ; in 

 -the other, it is advantageous. I do not, however, put 

 forward my own explanation as necessarily more correct 

 than that given by Mr. Eomanes (though I regard it myself 

 as more probable). My object is to show that it is possible 

 for two observers to regard the same activities of animals, 

 and read into them different psychological accompaniments. 

 Throughout the sections of Mr. Eomanes's work which deal 

 with the emotions, I feel myself forced at almost every turn 

 to question the validity of his inferences. 



From all that I have said in the last chapter, it will be 

 gathered that I am not prepared to credit our dumb com- 

 panions with a single sentiment. A sense of beauty, a 

 sense of the ludicrous, a sense of justice, and a sense of 

 right and wrong, — these abstract emotions or sentiments, 

 as such, are certainly impossible to the brute, if, as I have 

 contended, he is incapable of isolation and analysis. But, 

 as we have already seen, even with us these emotions have 

 to be particularized and brought within the perceptual 

 sphere ere they are strongly operative on conduct. We 

 are not roused to indignation by an abstract sense of 

 injustice, but by the particular performance of an unjust 

 deed. Even so, however, the emotional state aroused 

 carries with it in us some of the spirit of the conceptual 

 sphere from which it has descended. The analogous 

 emotions in animals cannot possess, if I am right, any 

 tincture of this conceptual spirit. And since we cannot 

 divest ourselves of our conceptual spirituality, we cannot 

 justly estimate what these emotional states, in dog or ape, 

 are like. Kemembering this, let us see what can be said 

 in favour of a perceptual sense of injustice, guilt, the 

 ludicrous, and the beautiful. In evidence of a sense of 

 justice, we have the oft-quoted case of the turnspit-dog 



