I 



Habit and Instinct. 463 



element may never have emerged, and the initiation may 

 have been a mere sense-stimulus . 



The division of voluntary activities into perceptual and 

 conceptual follows on the principles adopted and developed 

 in this work. As to the terminology employed, I agree with 

 Mr. S. Alexander * that it is convenient to reserve the terms 

 " desire " and " conduct " for use in the higher conceptual 

 plane. Animals, I believe, are incapable of this higher 

 desire and this higher conduct. It only remains to note 

 that it is within the limits of the fourth class (of voluntary 

 activities initiated by concepts) that morality takes its 

 origin. Morality is a matter of ideals. Moral progress 

 takes its origin in a state of dissatisfaction with one's 

 present moral condition, and of desire to reach a higher 

 standard. The man quite satisfied with himself has not 

 within him this mainspring of progress. The chief deter- 

 minant of the moral character of any individual is the 

 ideal self he keeps steadily in view as the object of moral 

 desire — the standard to be striven for, but never actually 

 attained. 



* " Moral Order and Progress." 



