Mental Evolution. 467 



le subjective side to motion are conscious. I shall venture, 

 lerefore, to coin a word * to meet my present need. 



It is generally admitted that physical phenomena, in- 

 jluding those which we call physiological, can be explained 

 (or are explicable) in terms of energy. It is also generally 

 admitted that consciousness is something distinct from, 

 lay, belonging to a wholly different phenomenal order from, 

 mergy. And it is further generally admitted that con 

 iciousness is nevertheless in some way-jclosely, if not 

 idissolubly, associated with special manifestations or 

 mergy in the nerve-centres of the brain. Now, we call 

 lanifestations of energy "akinetic " manifestations, and we 

 ise the term " kinesis " for physical manifestations of this 

 jrder. Similarly, we may call concomitant mamfestations 

 ►f the mental or conscious order " metakinetic," and may 

 ise the term "metakinesis " for all manifestations belong- 

 ig to this phenomenal order. According to the monistic 

 lypothesis, every Diode of kinesis has its concomitant mode of 

 letakinesis, and when the-Jdnetic mamfestations assume the 

 form of the molecular 'processes in the human brain, the meta- 

 dnetic jnanifestations assume the form of human consciousness. 

 am, therefore, not prepared to accept the horn of Mr. 

 'allace's dilemma in the form in which he states it. All 

 latter is not conscious, because consciousness is the meta- 

 inetic concomitant of a highly specialized order of kinesis. 

 [But every kinesis has an associated metakinesis; and 

 irallel to the evolution of organic and neural kinesis there 

 [has been an evolution of metakinetic manifestations culminating 

 conscious thought. 



Paraphrasing the words of Professor Max Miiller,t I 

 say, *' Like Descartes, like Spinoza, like Leibnitz, like 

 Noire, I require two orders of phenomena only, but I define 

 them differently, namely, as kinesis and metakinesis. 



* I consider that an apology is needed for the coinage of this and of two 

 or three other words, such as " construct," " isolate," and " predominant." I 

 can only say that in each case 1 endeavoured to avoid them, but found that I 

 could not make my meaning clear, or bring out the point I wished to emphasize 

 ■without tliem. 



t " Science of Thought," pp. 286,- 287. 



