472 Animal Life and Intelligence. 



sense only, but which materialists use in the nominative. 

 In another sense it is a logical blunder, because it rests 

 on a confusion between the objective and the subjective. 

 Matter can never be a subject, it can never know, be- 

 cause the name was framed to signify what is the object 

 of our knowledge or what can be known." Materialism, 

 then, for more than one sufficient reason, stands con- 

 demned. 



It should be stated, however, that Professor Herbert 

 seems to regard the monistic view I am advocating as 

 committed to the absurdity indicated in the passage I have 

 quoted. I am convinced that he was here in error. Indeed, 

 he seems to have failed to see the full bearing of the 

 monistic hypothesis ; for while he combats it, he comes 

 very near adopting it himself. With this, however, I have 

 no concern. I have only to show that, on the assumptions 

 above set down, we are not committed to the *' absurdity " 

 of supposing that intelligence and consciousness have had 

 no influence on the course of events in organic evolution — 

 that they have only felt the inevitable sequence of physical 

 phenomena without in any way influencing it. According 

 to the monistic hypothesis, kinesis and metakinesis are co- 

 ordinate. The physiologist may explain all the activities 

 of men and animals in terms of kinesis. The psychologist 

 may explain all the thoughts and emotions of man in terms 

 of metakinesis. They are studying the different phenomenal 

 aspects of the same noumenal sequences. It is just as 

 absurd to say that kinetic manifestations would have been 

 the same in the absence of metakinesis, as to say that the 

 metakinetic manifestations, the thoughts and emotions, 

 would have been the same in the absence of kinesis. It is 

 just as absurd to say that the physical series would have 

 been the same in the absence of mind, as to say that the 

 mental series would have been the same in the absence of 

 bodily organization. For on this view consciousness is no 

 mere b^-fii:^uct of neural processes, but is simply one 

 aspect of them. You cannot abstract (except in thought 

 and by analysis) metakinesis from kinesis ; for when you 



