Mental Evolution. 495 



which they could isolate in thought (conceptually) as also 

 isolable in fact (perceptually). And we may well suppose, 

 though this is, of course, hypothetical, that one of the 

 earliest severances to be thus effected through isolation 

 was the severance of mind and body. The first phenomena 

 that the nascent reason would endeavour to explain would 

 probably be those of daily life and almost hourly experi- 

 ence. Many familiar facts would seem to point to the 

 temporary or permanent divorce of the part which is 

 conscious and feels, from the part which is tangible and 

 visible. During wakeful life the two are closely associated. 

 The visible part, or body, is conscious. But during sleep, 

 or under the influence of a heavy blow, the visible part, 

 which before was conscious, is conscious no longer. The 

 conscious part is, therefore, absent, but returns again after 

 a while. On death the conscious part returns no more. 

 The divorce of the two has become permanent. 



And then comes in the confirmatory testimony of dreams. 

 In dreams the savage has seen his enemy, though that 

 enemy's body was far away. Here, then, is the spirit 

 which has left the body during sleep. In dreams also the 

 slain enemy or the dead chief appears. The spirit, per- 

 manently divorced from the body, still walks the earth in 

 spirit-guise. 



Many occurrences would seem like the fulfilled threats 

 of dead enemies or the fulfilled promises of dead ancestors. 

 How can these be explained ? Are they not produced by 

 the ghost of the departed enemy, by the spirit of the 

 deceased ancestor ? And if these spirits are still powerful 

 to act, why not petition them to act in certain ways ? 



Probably primitive man would explain all activities 

 anthropomorphically. What knows he of gravitation or 

 the laws of the winds ? He knows himself as agent, and 

 attributes his activities to the immaterial spirit within 

 him; for when this is absent during sleep or in death 

 these activities cease. All acting things might, therefore, 

 come to be regarded as dual in their nature — possessed of 

 a sensible material bodily part, and an insensible active 



