APHORISMS AND REFLECTIONS 39 



the same in an ape, or in a dog, and in a man. And 

 the suggestion that we must stop at the exact point 

 at which direct proof fails us, and refuse to believe 

 that the similarity which extends so far stretches 

 yet further, is no better than a quibble. Robinson 

 Crusoe did not feel bound to conclude, from the 

 single human footprint which he saw in the sand, 

 that the maker of the impression had only one 

 leg. 



CLIV 



Descartes, as we have seen, illustrates what he 

 means by an innate idea, by the analogy of hereditary 

 diseases or hereditary mental peculiarities, such as 

 generosity. On the other hand, hereditary mental 

 tendencies may justly be termed instincts ; and still 

 more appropriately might those special proclivities, 

 which constitute what we call genius, come into the 

 same category. 



CLV 



The child who is impelled to draw as soon as it 

 can hold a pencil ; the Mozart who breaks out into 

 music as early ; the boy Bidder who worked out the 

 most complicated sums without learning arithmetic ; 

 the boy Pascal who evolved Euclid out of his own 

 consciousness : all these may be said to have been 

 impelled by instinct, as much as are the beaver and 

 the bee. And the man of genius is distinct in kind 

 from the man of cleverness, by reason of the working 

 within him of strong innate tendencies — which 

 cultivation may improve, but which it can no 

 more create than horticulture can make thistles 

 bear figs. The analogy between a musical instrii- 



