APHORISMS AND REFLECTIONS 129 



been, and is, and will be ; and society, like art, is 

 therefore a part of nature. But it is convenient to 

 distinguish those parts of nature in which man plays 

 the part of immediate cause, as something apart ; 

 and therefore, society, like art, is usefully to be 

 considered as distinct from nature. It is the more 

 desirable, and even necessary, to make this distinc- 

 tion, since society differs from nature in having a 

 definite moral object ; whence it comes about that 

 the course shaped by the ethical man— the member 

 of society or citizen— necessarily runs counter to that 

 which the non-ethical man— the primitive savage, 

 or man as a mere member of the animal kingdom — 

 tends to adopt. The latter fights out the struggle 

 for existence to the bitter end, like any other animal ; 

 the former devotes his best energies to the object of 

 setting limits to the struggle. 



CCLXXV 



The first men who substituted the state of 

 mutual peace for that of mutual war, whatever the 

 motive which impelled them to taKe that step, 

 created society. But, in establishing peace, they 

 obviously put a limit upon the struggle for existence. 

 Between the members of that society, at any rate, 

 it was not to be pursued a outrance. And of all the 

 successive shapes which society has taken, that 

 most nearly approaches perfection in which the war 

 of individual against individual is most strictly 

 limited. The primitive savage, tutored by I star, 

 appropriated whatever took his fancy, and killed 

 whosoever opposed him, if he could. On the 

 contrary, the ideal of the ethical man is to limit his 

 freedom of action to a sphere in which he does not 

 interfere with the freedom of others ; he seeks the 

 common weal as much as his own ; and, indeed, as 

 an essential part of his own welfare. Peace is both 



K 



