56 CONSCIOUSNESS 
take this as a sample of the nature of a conscious situation 
which is effective in guidance. We have seen the nature of 
the elements (sensory data, including as essential those sup- 
plied by the behaviour itself, with a pleasurable or painful 
tone) which enter into such a situation; we have seen that 
they owe their primary origin to direct presentation, but that 
they may be subsequently introduced indirectly in re-presenta- 
tive form ; we have seen that the situation as a whole results 
from the coalescence of the data. There only remains the 
question how the felt situation takes effect on behaviour. 
And to this question, unfortunately, we can give but a meagre 
and incomplete reply. All we can say is, that connections 
seem to be in some way established between the centres of 
conscious control and the centres of congenital response ; and 
that through these channels the responsive behaviour may be 
either checked or augmented (as a whole or in part), accord- 
ing to the tone, disagreeable or pleasant, that suffuses the 
situation. How this is effected we do not fully know, 
IIl].—LateR PHASES IN MENTAL DEVELOPMENT 
: Some surprise may be felt that in our brief discussion of 
the early stages of mental development nothing has been said 
of percepts and concepts, nothing of abstraction or generaliza- 
tion. The omission is not only due to a desire to avoid the 
subtle technicalities of psychological nomenclature. It is 
partly due to the wish not to forejudge a difficult question of 
interpretation. Spirited passages of arms from time to time 
take place between psychologists in opposing camps, as to 
whether animals are or are not capable of forming abstract 
and general ideas ; and untrained camp followers hang on the 
skirts of the fray, making a good deal of noise with blank- 
cartridge. The question at issue turns partly on the defini- 
tions of technical terms ; partly, when there is agreement on 
this point, on the interpretation to be put on certain modes of 
behaviour. Nothing seems at first sight much easier than to 
say what we mean by an abstract idea or by a general idea. 
