THE CONSCIOUS ASPECT IOI 
afford data to consciousness, telling us that the movements are 
in progress or have been effected. The nerves involved in the 
latter part are quite different from those concerned in the 
former part, and they proceed to areas of the brain differently 
situated from those whence the efferent waves issued. Thus 
it is in all cases of movement ; the efferent nerves call the 
muscles into play ; the afferent nerves bring information that 
the movements are carried out. It is through the latter that 
data are unquestionably afforded to consciousness. 
But in the case of any complex action—and, as we have 
seen, instinctive behaviour is often remarkably complex—the 
information that the action has begun comes in before the 
behaviour is completed. Practically we may say that any 
given stage of performance and the consciousness it evokes are 
simultaneous ; for though in strictness the one lags just a 
little behind the other, yet they are so nearly coincident in 
time that we may disregard the interval between them. Such 
being the case, therefore, we may fairly regard the felt 
performance of the instinctive act as capable of introducing 
important elements into the conscious situation. 
But not only does instinctive behaviour thus introduce 
important elements into the conscious situation, it is also 
called forth by stimuli which themselves afford not less 
important elements. To exclude these from any consideration 
of instinct, in its conscious aspect, would render the treatment 
of the problem so incomplete as to be wholly unsatisfactory 
from a psychological point of view. Can we believe that 
when the moor-hen dived, as it never had dived before, at the 
sight of the rough-haired pup, the vivid experience of that 
strange and disquieting intruder did not enter into, and form 
a prominent feature in, the conscious situation? If we are to 
consider the conscious aspect at all, we must try and grasp the 
situation as a whole. And on these grounds we may yet 
further broaden our conception so as to include, from the 
psychological point of view, not only the behaviour itself, 
and its effects in consciousness, but also the stimulating con- 
ditions under which it is called into play. If, then, we accept 
