256 THE FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS 
named in better terms than “good spirits” and the joy of 
existence, so forcibly suggested during the free play of youth. 
On the other hand, there is no more piteous sight than 
that afforded by the young animal, “cabined, cribbed, con- 
fined,” suffering from ennwi and depression—all its organic 
processes sluggish and craving to be quickened into the 
natural vigour of life, not creeping slowly through the veins, 
but coursing at full flood. 
In the psychological aspect of play Dr. Groos assigns 
perhaps the first place to pleasure in the possession of power, 
or, as Preyer phrases it, pleasure in being a cause. We must 
be careful, however, lest in using such expressions we seem to 
imply that animals—even quite young animals—are capable 
of entertaining ideas which belong to a much later stage of 
mental development. Speaking of “joy in ability or power,” 
Professor Groos says,* “This feeling is first a conscious pre- 
sentation to ourselves of our personality as it is emphasized 
by play. . . . But it is more than this; it is also delight in 
the control we have over our bodies and over external objects 
Experimentation in its simple as well as its more complicated 
forms is, apart from its effect on physical development, educa- 
tive in that it helps in the formation of causal associations. 
. . . The young bear that plays in the water, the dog that 
tears a paper into scraps, the ape that delights in producing 
new and uncouth sounds, the sparrow that exercises its voice, 
the parrot that smashes his feeding trough—all experience the 
pleasure in energetic activity, which is, at the same time, joy 
in being able to accomplish something.” But those who 
agree with Dr. Stout, as I do without hesitation, in denying 
personality (save in a very embryonic condition) and the con- 
ception of causation to animals in the perceptual stage 
of mental evolution, though they may find in Dr. Groos’s 
contention a central core of truth, will be unable fully to 
accept his manner of presenting it. “Any single train of 
perceptual activity,” t says Dr. Stout, “has internal unity and 
* Op. cit., p. 290. 
t “ Manual of Psychology,” p. 266. 
