EVOLUTION OF FEELING AND EMOTION 285 
of the kind of thing which we suppose is meant, and which is 
probably more or less correct. We want here and now to 
get clear ideas, and to express them with some approach to 
accuracy. To say that pleasure is the psychological end of 
intelligent behaviour is to put the matter too subjectively 
and in too abstract aform. Professor Mackenzie has clearly 
indicated the ambiguity in the word “pleasure.” ‘* Pleasure,” 
he says,* “is sometimes understood to mean agreeable feeling, 
or the feeling of satisfaction, and sometimes it is understood 
to mean an object which gives satisfaction. The hearing of 
music is sometimes said to be a pleasure, but of course the 
hearing of music is not a feeling of satisfaction; it is an 
object that gives satisfaction. Generally, it may be observed 
that when we speak of ‘pleasures’ in the plural, or rather in 
the concrete, we mean objects that give satisfaction ; whereas 
when we speak of ‘pleasure’ in the abstract, we more often 
mean the feeling of satisfaction which such objects bring with 
them.” May we not go a step further, but entirely in the 
same direction, and say that pleasure is a constituent part of 
the concept self as an object of thought or desire; that its 
proper sphere is in the ideational consciousness ; and that, as 
we interpret the animal mind, it has no place as such therein ? 
The hedonist regards pleasure as the most excellent and dis- 
tinctive characteristic of his ideal self and his ideal community. 
But animals have not risen or fallen to the level of hedonism. 
Pleasure is not for them a motive of conduct, though nice 
objects, as such, are attractive, and through them impulse 
acquires direction and force. 
If, in animal psychology, we are to use the words pleasure 
and pain (as the antithesis of pleasure)—and they seem 
more properly to belong to a plane of mental development to 
which animals probably have not attained—we may say that 
the pleasure or the pain which attaches to any centre of 
interest in the situation is that which gives it attractive or 
repellent meaning; it furthers conation either towards or, 
as Hobbes would say, fromwards. But if we put the matter in 
* «Manual of Ethics,” p. 72. 
