124 ADAM SMITH. 



while a third class, much more consistently, consider 

 that the approving of what is generally useful, and dis- 

 approving of what is generally hurtful, arises from the 

 exercise of an inherent faculty or moral sense, an innate 

 principle or property in our nature, irresistible and 

 universal. The like defect is imputable to Dr. Smith's 

 theory, and is only to be supplied either by Dr. Paley's 

 method of reasoning, or by the last supposition to which 

 I have referred. But all this concedes a great deal more 

 than is due to the ' Theory of Sympathy/ and assumes it 

 to stand on as good a foundation as that of 'Utility/ 

 Now one consideration, which has in part been antici- 

 pated, shows that such is not the case. We may sympa- 

 thise with another, that is, we may feel that in his 

 position our own inclinations would be exactly the same 

 with those under which he appears to be acting, and 

 yet we may equally feel that we should deserve blame, 

 and not approval. Why ? " Because," says Dr. Smith, 

 " we take into the account also that others, that is to 

 say, men in general, not under the influence of excite- 

 ment to disturb their feelings or their judgments, will 

 disapprove." But why should they \ If they are to 

 place themselves, as we are desired to do, in the situation 

 of the propositus, of him whose conduct is the subject 

 of consideration, they must each of them feel, as we do 

 ourselves, that in his situation they would do as he is 

 doing, or, at least, would be inclined so to do. There- 

 fore, this appeal to others in general, this calling in the 

 general sense to correct the individual, can have no effect 

 upon the hypothesis; it can only exert any influence, or 

 apply any correction, upon some other hypothesis. It ap- 

 pears, therefore, that in every view the theory is unsound. 



