APPENDIX A 423 



fishings in the tenendas or in any other clause of the charter will 

 not operate as a conveyance of salmon fishings. Nor will the word 

 'fishings' operate as a title for prescription, unless it be in the 

 dispositive clause. The object of each of the other clauses is well 

 understood and is quite different from that of describing the subjects 

 conveyed. One consequence of this has been that the Barons of 

 Exchequer, whose duty it was to revise the signatures of Crown 

 charters when these titles were expede, were not in the practice of 

 revising the clause of tenendas at all. It is quite understood that a 

 specification in the tenendas adds nothing to the dispositive clause." 

 This case went to the House of Lords, and commenting upon the 

 passage just quoted from Lord Deas, the late Mr. Tait adds : " The 

 House of Lords went hardly so far as this, holding that while the 

 dispositive clause was the only clause in which an effective con- 

 veyance of the right of salmon fishing could be made, still an 

 ambiguous word in that clause (e.g. " pertinents ") might be construed 

 by a direct reference to fishing in the tenendas." 1 To follow the 

 question of title into nicer points of detail seems to me unnecessary. 

 One or two points of application are, however, of interest to the 

 salmon angler, and these I will endeavour to touch upon. 



A Crown fishing on the coast is very frequently ex adverso the 

 estate of a proprietor who has no interest in the salmon fishing. 

 The Crown tenant must, however, have access to his fishery. In 

 the same way, if a river flows through the estate of a proprietor who 

 has no right of salmon fishing, the owner of the right has liberty 

 to be upon the river banks to exercise the right. In net fishing in a 

 river it has in the same way to be decided that if the owner of the 

 right has no property on either bank, he or his tenant may haul his 

 net on either bank. 



A proprietor of fishings on one bank may not erect any obstruc- 

 tion, such even as a croy or fishing pier, without the consent of his 

 opposite neighbour. If, however, a proprietor owns both banks he 

 is under no such necessity, but if an obstruction, such for instance 

 as a weir, be erected, it is possible for another proprietor of fishings 

 in the river to raise valid objection provided he can prove damage 

 to his fishings, or show an alteration in the natural flow or con- 

 ditions of the river so as to induce damage. 2 



Now with regard to Statute Law, it is very interesting to notice 



J Lord Advocate v. Sinclair, 1867, 5 M. (H.L.) 91. Lord Advocate v. M'Culloch, 

 1874, 2 R. 27. 

 2 Orr Ewing & Co. v. Colquhoun's Trustees. 4 R. (H.L.) p. 126. 



