236 ANIMAL AUTOMATISM. [LECT. 



molecular changes which give rise to muscular motion ? 

 I see no such evidence. The frog walks, hops, swims, 

 and goes through his gymnastic performances quite as 

 well without consciousness, and consequently without 

 volition, as with it; and, if a frog, in his natural 

 state, possesses anything corresponding with what we 

 call volition, there is no reason to think that it is 

 anything but a concomitant of the molecular changes 

 in the brain which form part of the series involved in 

 the production of motion. 



The consciousness of brutes would appear to be 

 related to the mechanism of their body simply as a 

 collateral product of its working, and to be as com- 

 pletely without any power of modifying that working 

 as the steam -whistle which accompanies the work of 

 a locomotive engine is without influence upon its 

 machinery. Their volition, if they have any, is an 

 emotion indicative of physical changes, not a cause of 

 such changes. 



This conception of the relations of states of con- 

 sciousness with molecular changes in the brain of 

 psychoses with neuroses does not prevent us from 

 ascribing free will to brutes. For an agent is free 

 when there is nothing to prevent him from doing that 

 which he desires to do. If a greyhound chases a 

 hare, he is a free agent, because his action is in entire 

 accordance with his strong desire to catch the hare ; 

 while so long as he is held back by the leash he is not 

 free, being prevented by external force from following 

 his inclination. And the ascription of freedom to the 

 greyhound under the former circumstances is by no 



