eepoet of state board of fish commissioneks. 107 



The Attorney-General is Authorized to Maintain Actions of this 

 Character in the Name of the People. 



The People is the proper party on the complaint of the < Attorney- 

 General. (People vs. Davidson, 30 Cal. 388; People vs. Gold Run, etc., 

 Co., 66 Cal. 138, 56 Am. Rep. 80; People vs. Pope, 53 Cal. 437; People 

 vs. Blake, 60 Cal., 497; People vs. Reed, 81 Cal. 70, Am. St. Rep. 22; 

 People vs. Hihernia Sav., etc., Society, 84 Cal. 634; People vs. Elk River 

 M. & L. Co., 107 Cal. 215; People vs. Beaudry, 91 Cal. 220.) 



The above are a few of the cases reported where actions have been 

 brought in the name of the people to abate and restrain nuisances. 



In the case of A. G. vs. Shrewsbury Bridge Co. (Eng. case), 21 C. D. 

 752, held, that where an illegal act is being committed, which in its 

 nature tends to the damage of the public, the Attorney-General can 

 maintain an action on behalf of the public to restrain the commission of 

 the act without adducing any evidence of actual damage to the public; 

 and the Court accordingly granted an injunction with costs, though no 

 evidence of actual damage was given. (Brice on Ultra Vires (3d ed.), p. 

 761.) 



Counsel attempts to draw a distinction between the Attorney-General 

 bringing a suit in the name of the people on his own information and 

 in bringing it on the relation of a private person. 



There is no difference in its legal effect. The People is the party 

 plaintiff and not the relator. The reason stated by counsel in their 

 brief, to wit: that costs and expenses of suits could not be recovered 

 against the State in case defendant was successful in such suit, and 

 that by having a relator he would be responsible for costs, is not well 

 founded. The State is liable for costs awarded against it, the same as a 

 private individual. 



The only object attained by bringing an action on the relation of a 

 private person, is that the parties directly interested may be required to 

 give the State security for costs; the bond is a protection to the State, 

 not to the defendant. 



Counsel seem to be under a misapprehension of the law in reference to 

 security to the defendant afforded by a bond, according to their state- 

 ment on page 22 of their brief. 



The bond that may be required by the Attorney-General is simply 

 for costs of suit — not for damages that may result by reason of the 

 injunction. A relator would not be liable for such damages. 



The authorities cited by counsel are not law now. The State and 

 counties may be sued under existing statutes which make these decisions 

 inapplicable to the case at bar. 



