Morality 

 Motion 



SCIENTIFIC SIDE-LIGHTS 



458 



becomes overcast, threatening the rider with 

 a drenching if he perseveres in his inten- 

 tion; his decision will then be founded on a 

 prudential consideration of the relative 

 probabilities of his escaping or of his being 

 exposed to the shower, and of how far the 

 enjoyment he may derive from his ride is 

 likely to be replaced by the discomfort of a 

 thorough wetting. But suppose, further, 

 that instead of taking a mere pleasure ride, 

 a medical man is about to set forth on a 

 professional visit to a patient whose condi- 

 tion requires his aid; a new motive is thus 

 introduced, which alters the condition of the 

 whole question, making it no longer one of 

 prudence only, but one of morality. CAR- 

 PENTER Mental Physiology, ch. 9, p. 416. 

 (A., 1900.) 



2244. MORALITY, ELEMENTAL, OF 

 LOWER ANIMALS " Man the God of the 

 Dog." Of these elementary moral feelings, 

 those of the lower animals which associate 

 most closely with man are obviously capable. 

 The sense of duty towards a being of a 

 higher nature, which shows itself in the ac- 

 tions of the young child towards its parent 

 or nurse, long before any ideational compre- 

 hension of it can have been attained, is ex- 

 actly paralleled by that of the dog or the 

 horse towards its master. " Man," as Burns 

 truly says, " is the god of the dog." CAR- 

 PENTER Mental Physiology, bk. i, ch. 5, 

 190, p. 212. (A., 1900.) 



2245. MORALITY INDEPENDENT OF 

 REWARD OR PUNISHMENT It is true, 

 indeed, that these rightful authorities, 

 which are enthroned in Nature, are fortified 

 by power to enforce their commands, and to 

 punish violations of the duty of obedience. 

 It is true, therefore, that from the first mo- 

 ments of our existence the sense of obliga- 

 tion is reenforced by the fear of punishment. 

 And yet we know, both as a matter of in- 

 ternal consciousness, and as a matter of 

 familiar observation in others, that this 

 sense of obligation is not only separable 

 from the fear of punishment, but is even 

 sharply contradistinguished from it. Not 

 only is the sense of obligation powerful in 

 cases where the fear of punishment is im- 

 possible, but in direct proportion as the fear 

 of punishment mixes or prevails, the moral 

 character of an act otherwise good is di- 

 minished or destroyed. The fear of punish- 

 ment and the hope of reward are, indeed, 

 auxiliary forces which cannot be dispensed 

 with in society. But we feel that complete 

 goodness and perfect virtue would dispense 

 with them altogether. ARGYLL Unity of 

 Nature, ch. 9, p. 211. (Burt.) 



2246. MORALITY IN INTENTION- 



There can be no moral character in any 

 action, so far as the individual actor is con- 

 cerned, apart from the meaning and inten- 

 tion of the actor. The very same deed may 

 be good or, on the contrary, devilishly bad, 

 according to the inspiring motive of him 

 who does it. The giving of a cup of cold 



water to assuage suffering, and the giving 

 it to prolong life in order that greater suf- 

 fering may be endured, are the same out- 

 ward deeds, but are exactly opposite in 

 moral character. ARGYLL Unity of Nature,. 

 ch. 9, p. 197. (Burt.) 



2247. MORALITY NOT A MATTER 



OF SEX Pugnacity of Men and Women. 

 Tho the female sex is often said to have less 

 pugnacity than the male, the difference 

 seems connected more with the extent of the 

 motor consequences of the impulse than with 

 its frequency. Women take offense and get 

 angry, if anything, more easily than men,, 

 but their anger is inhibited by fear and 

 ether principles of their nature from ex- 

 pressing itself in blows. JAMES Psychology, 

 vol. ii, ch. 24, p. 415. (H. H. & Co., 1899.) 



2248. MORALS, FOUNDATION OF 



Imaginary Laws of Nature Rousseau The 

 French Revolution. M. Comte was right in 

 affirming that the prevailing schools of 

 moral and political speculation, when not 

 theological, have been metaphysical. They 

 affirmed that moral rules, and even political 

 institutions, were not means to an end, the 

 general good, but corollaries evolved from 

 the conception of natural rights. This was- 

 especially the case in all the countries in 

 which the ideas of publicists were the off- 

 spring of the Roman law. The legislators 

 of opinion on these subjects, when not the- 

 ologians, were lawyers : and the Continental 

 lawyers followed the Roman jurists, who* 

 followed the Greek metaphysicians, in ac- 

 knowledging as the ultimate source of right 

 and wrong in morals, and consequently in 

 institutions, the imaginary law of the imagi- 

 nary being Nature. The first systematizers. 

 of morals in Christian Europe, on any other 

 than a purely theological basis, the writers, 

 on international law, reasoned wholly from 

 these premises, and transmitted them to a 

 long line of successors. This mode of 

 thought reached its culmination in Rous- 

 seau, in whose hands it became as powerful 

 an instrument for destroying the past as it 

 was impotent for directing the future. The 

 complete victory which this philosophy 

 gained in speculation over the old doctrines, 

 was temporarily followed by an equally com- 

 plete practical triumph, the French Revolu- 

 tion; when, having had, for the first time, 

 a full opportunity of developing its tend- 

 encies, and showing what it could not do, it 

 failed so conspicuously as to determine a, 

 partial reaction to the doctrines of feudal- 

 Ism and Catholicism. MILL Positive Phi- 

 losophy of Auguste Comte, p. 64. (H. H. & 

 Co., 1887.) 



2249. MOTH ASSUMES INSTANT 

 INVISIBILITY Protective Mimicry. It was 

 in the beautiful Riviera, where insect life 

 continues much more active at that season 

 than it can be anywhere in the north of 

 Europe. But even there, altho bees are busy 

 during the greater part of winter, and some 

 of our own Sylviadce find an abundant living 



