THE CONCEPT OF EVOLUTION 379 



in a definite direction, whereby distinctively new individualities arise, 

 take root and flourish, alongside of, or in place of the originative 

 stock. In a general way, it means that the present, with its fine 

 fauna and flora and the inter-relations of these, is the product of 

 the past and the promise of the future. 



It is necessary, however, to consider the view that evolution may 

 have been not synthetic complexifying, but analytic simplification, 

 by a removal of inhibitions which has allowed the original rich- 

 ness of endownment to express itself with increasing fulness. This 

 view of evolution is open to several serious objections which show 

 its untenability. In so far as the view means that there is noth- 

 ing evolved which was not in kind originally involved, that there 

 is nothing of lasting value in the end which was not present in 

 kind in the beginning, it is acceptable. But Biology is justified in 

 regarding evolution as a racial epigenesis. 



The evolution-formula cannot be demonstrated like that of grav- 

 itation; it is acceptable because it fits and is never contradicted 

 by facts. The so-called " evidences of evolution " anatomical, em- 

 bryological, palasontological, and so on are multitudinous; but 

 they are never more than presumptive. The real strength of the 

 evolutionist's position is in the value of the theory as an organon. 

 There is no other scientific formulation in the field. The weakness 

 of the evolutionist's position is that he remains very ignorant as to 

 the pedigree of many of the most important types, such as Verte- 

 brates; as to the factors leading to the establishment of great new 

 departures, such as birds or men; and as to the causes of varia- 

 tion itself. But the inquiry is young. 



The difficulties in the way of concrete evolution-theory, which 

 will probably disappear as knowledge grows, have prompted the 

 suggestion made by Alfred Russel Wallace and others that special 

 spiritual influxes have operated at various critical stages in the 

 process of becoming. This means a premature abandonment of the 

 scientific problem, which proposes to work with verifiable factors; 

 it suggests a fanciful dualism of two worlds, one of which occasion- 

 ally intrudes effectively into the other; it gives up the idea of con- 

 tinuity of process. It is not to be identified with the conviction 

 that more is involved in evolving organisms than is recognised by 

 those who insist on restricting their formulation to mechanistic 

 terms. 



Evolution is continuous in the sense that it is a process without 

 gaps. But it is not without steps, for discontinuous variations or 



