ioo Of the Advancement of Learning, Lib. III. 



Arifiot. 



gations of Motions --^ and in Meafures of Motions^ the Thyfick^of Abfira&s 

 is accoMplif.H. As for voluntary Motion in Animals 5 Motion in the 

 Aftions ofSenfes^ Motion of the Imagination j of the Appetite, and of 

 the will --i Motion of the mind^ of the difcerning faculty , or Praftick 

 Judgement jand of the Intel/e&uab,\ve refer over to their proper Know- 

 ledges. Tet thus much ugain we advertise, that all thefe Particulars we 

 have delivered, are no farther to be handled in Thyftck^ than the en- 

 quiry of their Matter znd Eficient ; for according to their Forms and 

 Ends they are revifed and re-examined in Metaphyficl{, 



V. IVe will here annex two notable Appendices^ which have reference 

 not fo much to the Matter , as to the Manner of Inquiry ; Natural 

 Problems 5 and Placits of Ancient Thilofophers. The firlt is the Appen- 

 dix of multiplied or fparfed Nature 5 the fecond of Nature united or cf 

 fumms. Both thefe belong to a grave and circumfpeft moving ofdonhts^ 

 which is no mean part of Knowledge : For Problems comprehend j)dr- 

 ticular Dubitdtions •-, PUcits , general 5 about Principles and the Fa- 

 brick. Of Problems there is an excellent example in the writing of^ri- 

 ProbT* fi^^^ 5 which kind of work certainly deferv'd not only to have been 

 celebrated by Pofterity 5 but by their labours to have been continued 5 

 feeing new doubts arife daily. But in this point Caution is to be taken, 

 and that of great Importance. The recording and propofing oi Doubts 

 hath in it a two-fold ufe : 0«e, that it munites and fortifies Philolbphy 

 againft errors 5 when that which is not altogether fo clear and evident 

 is not defin'd and avouched, (left error ftiould beget error)but a judge- 

 ment upon it is fufpended, and is not definitive. The other, that the 

 entry o( DoMbts,znd recording of themjare fo many Sponges which con- 

 tinually fuck and draw in unto them an increafe and improvement of 

 Knowledge 5 whereby it comes to pais that thofe things, which with- 

 out the fuggeftion of Doubts»had been (lightly, and without obfer- 

 vation palled over.are by occafion offuch Dubitations^more ftrioufly and 

 attentively confidered. But thefe two utilities fcarce recompence one 

 difcommodity, which unleft it be carefully lookt unto, infinuateth it 

 felf, namely. That a doubt once acknowledged asjujilymade, and become^ 

 as it were^ authenticl{^^ prefentlyjiirs up defendants both ways , who in Uks 

 manner commend over the fame liberty of doubting to Pojlerity ^fo that men 

 Lend and apply their wits, rather to ksep a doubt jiiH on foot, than to de- 

 termine andfolve it, Inftances of this cafe we have every where, both 

 in Jurifconfults 5 and in Students in the Univerfities 5 who if they have 

 oncecntertainda Doubt, it goes ever after authoriz'd {or 3. Doubt, zS- 

 fumingunto themlelvesa priviledge, as well of Dubitation,a$ ofAjfer- 

 tion : IVhcrcas the right ufe of Reafon is, to make things doubtful certain 5 

 and not to call things certain, into doubt : Wherefore I report as Deficient 

 a Calendar of Dubitations, or Problems in Nature, and approve the un- 

 dertaking of fuch a work, as a profitable pains j (6 care be had, that as 

 knowledge daily grows up, Cwhieh certainly will come to pais, if men 

 hearken unto us) fuch Doubts as be clearly difcuft, aud brought to re- 

 folution, be rafed out of the Catalogue of Problems. To this Calendar, I 

 would have another annext no lefsufeful ; For feeing that in all Enqui- 

 ries, there be found thefe three forts of things j things manifeflly true ^ 

 Doubtful -^ manifejily falfe: It would be a very profitable courfe to ad- 

 joy n to the Calendar of Doubts, and Non-liquets 3 a Calender ofFalfiioods, 



abd 



