1 44 Of the Advancement of Learning. L i b. V. 



fee the fame fteps leading to error, troden in divine and humane enqui- 

 ries. For as in the apprehending of divine truth, men cannot endure 

 to become as a child; (bin the apprehending of humane truth, for men 

 come to years, yet to read, and repeat, the firft Elements of Indu&i- 

 ons^ as if they were ftiU childrenjis reputed a poor and contemptible 

 tmploymcnt. 



§ Thirdly if it be granted, that the Principlei of Sciences may be 

 rightly inferr'd from the Inclusion, which they ufe, or from fenfe and 

 experience 5 yet neverthelefs, certain it is, that inferiour Axioms,can- 

 not rightly and fafely be deduced, by Syllogifm from them, in things 

 of nature, which participate of matter. For in ^/^<?g;y«f there is a re- 

 duftion of Propofitions to PriHciples by middle Propofitions. And this 

 Form, whether for Invention, or for ^roof in Sciences Popular, as 

 Ethickj , Politick.f, Laws, and the like, takes place; yea, andinDi- 

 vinity ; feeing it hath pleafed God of hisgoodnefs, to accommodate 

 himfelf to mans capacity : but in Natural Philofophy where nature 

 ftiould be convinc'd and vanquifht by deeds, and not an Adverfary, by, 

 Argument ; truth plainly efcapes our hands ; becaufe that thefubtilty of 

 the operations of Nature^ is far greater than thefubtilty of words. So that 

 the Syllogifm thus failing, there is every way need of help and fervice, 

 of true and reftified Indtt&ion, as well for the more general Principles, 

 as inferiour Propofitions. f^r .S///^_gi/5»/ confift of Propofitions, Pro- 

 pofitions of words, words are the currant tokens or marks of the Noti- 

 ons of things 5 wherefore ifthefe Notions (which are the fouls ef words y 

 be grofTcly, gnd variably abftrafted from thftigs, the whole building 

 falls. Neither is it the laborious examination either of Conlequenccs, 

 Arguments, or the verity of Propofitions, that can ever repair that ru- 

 ine; being the error is, asthePhyficians (peak, in the firji digeftioti y 

 which is not redified by thefequent funftions of N.-jture. And there- 

 fore it was not without great and evident Caule, thai many of the Phi- 

 lofophers, and fome of them, fome of fingular note, hecc^me Acade- 

 mickj 5 and Sceptickj ; which took away all certainty of knowledge or of 

 Comprehenfions ; and denyed that the knowledge of man extended fur- 

 ther than apparence and probability. ' It is true that fome are of opi- 

 nion, that Socrates, when he put ofFcertainty of fcience from himfelf^ 



ca'd!'"'^ did thisbut by aformof/r^jwy, &fcientiam difjiimHlandofimulaffe^ that 

 is,that by renouncing thole things which he manifeftly knew, he might 

 be reputed to know even that which he knew not; neither in the la- 

 ter Academy,which Cicero embracedjWas this opinion o^Acatalepjie held 

 fo fincerely : For all thofe which excell'd for eloquence, commonly 



In Acad, made choice of this Sedt, as fitter to give glory to their copious (peech, 

 and variable dilcourfe both ways ; which wasthecau(e they turn'd a- 

 fide from that ftreight way by which they Qiould have gone on to truth, 

 topleafant walks made for delight and paftime.Nr(?/ip///i/Z4»<5//«^ it ap- 

 pears that there were many fcatter'd in both Academiesjthe old and new 

 (much more zmongthc Sceptickj^hzt held thisAcatalej-fi m fimplicity 

 and integrity : But here was their chief error, that .they charged the 

 Perceptions of theSenfcs,when:hy they did extirpate and pluck up Scien- 

 ces by the roots. For the fenfes although they many times deftitute and 

 deceive men, yet aflifted by mnch induftry they may be fufficient for Sci- 

 ences ; and that not lb much by the help of I/j^iruments (though thefe 



arc 



Cic.lnA- 



o. 



