158 Of the Advancement of Learning. L i e. V» 



Come meafure moderate theflH&tiations^ and vpheelings of the u/iderjiand- 

 ing, fearing it may be, the falling of their Heaven. Therefore men 

 have hajined toofati tofet down principle t of Sciences, about nhich all the 

 variety of DifpHtations might turn tvithout peril ofruiae orfubvcrjion. In 

 truth not knowing that he who too early lays hold on certainties, will con- 

 clude in ambiguities ••, and he thatfeafonably fufpends his Judgement^ Jljall 

 attain to Certainties. 



§ So then it is manifeft, that this Art of Judging by Syllogifm is no- 

 thing elfe, but the redu(3:ion of Propofitions to Principles, by middle 

 terms 3 and Principles are underftood to be agreed of by all, and are 

 exempt from Argument. But the invention of middle terras is per- 

 mitted to the free fagacity, and purfuit of mens wits. This ReduSion n 

 of two kjnds^DireU and Inverted. DireU is, when the Propofition is re- 

 duced to the Principle, which is call'd Probation O^ienjive. Inverfed is, 

 when the Contradiftory of the Propofition is reduced to the Contra- 

 diftory of the Principle 5 which they terra a Probation from incongrui- 

 ty, or an abfurdity. The number alfo of middle terms, or their fcalc is 

 diminifhed or increafed, as they are remov'd from the Principle of the 

 Propofition. 



§ Thefe grounds laid, roe will divide the Art of Judgement (as for moft 

 part generally it is ) into Analytick_Art ^ and the Do&rine of Elenchfj 

 the one giveth Direction, the other Caution. For Analyticl^ fetteth 

 down the true Forms of Confequences of Argument by a Variation, 

 and Defledlion, from which, the Conclufion is deprehended to be er- 

 roneous ; and this part contains in it a kind of £/e«r/j, or Redargutioa. 



V.Euclid. For, as it is (aid, Re6lum d^fui index eji, d^ obliqui. Notwitnftanding 



& Cora- it jsthe fafeft wayto fetdown Elenchs as Monitors, whereby Fallacies, 

 which otherwife might infnarc the Judgement, may be more eafiiy de- 

 tefted. In the Analytick^ Part we find nothing Deficient, which, ra-? 

 ther is loaden with fuperfluities , than any way is wanting in accef- 

 fions. 



n. The Knowledge of Elenchs we divide into three Parts : Elenchs of 

 Sophifms !y Elencht of Intepretation ; and Elenchs of Images or Idolaes. 

 The Dodrine of Elenchs of Sophifms is very ufeful , for although the 

 the more grofs fort o[ Fallacies is (as Seneca makes the comparifbn ve- 



«pift.4y.' ry well) But asthefeatsofjuglers, which t bough we know not how they 

 are done j yet we k»ow well it is not as it feems to be. Yet the more 

 fubtil fort of Sophifms doth not only put a man befides his anfwer, but 

 doth in good earneft abufe his Judgement. 



ij This Part concerning the Elenchs of Sophifms is excellently handled 



^ by AriHotle in Precept 5 but more excellently by Plato in Example, not 



only in the Perfonof the Ancient Sophifts, Gt;r^7jj, Hippias, Protagoras 



and £«//j/V/fw«/,and the reft 5 but even in the Perlbn of .S"^fr4/(?/ him- 



i"f^f?p^'^ felf , who profefliiig to affirm nothing, but to infirm whatfoever others 

 avouch, hath exaftly expreffed all the Forms oiobje&ions. Fallacies and 

 Redargntions. Wherefore in this Part wc have nothing Deficient. But 

 this, in the mean time, is to be noted, that though we make the inge- 

 nuous and principal u(e of this Knowledge to confift in thiSjTA^f So- 

 phifms may be redargued 5 yet it is manifeji, that the degenerate and 

 corrupt ufe thereof is imploy'd to contrive , and impofe Captions and 

 Contradi&ions , by thefe Sophifms '■, which p^ffeth fur a great Faculty , 



and 



