Lib. VII. Of the Advancement of Learning. 227 



inftead of a formal and eflential advancement are carried in a blinde 

 ambition to an advancement only Local. For as thofe which are 

 fick and find no Remedy, do tumble up and dovvn^and change place, 

 as if by a remove Local, they could obtain a remove Interngl, and 

 (hift of their difeafe : fo it is in Ambition that men being polTe(s'd 

 and led away with afalfe refemblance of exalting their nature, pur- 

 chafe nothing elfe but an eminence and celfitude of Place. 



^. But Good Confervative is no other thznthc reception and fruiti- 

 on of things agreeable to our Nature 5 and this Good though it be raoft 

 fimple and native ; yet feems it to be of all other kinds of Good the 

 fofteft and loweft. And this Good alfo admits a difference , which 

 hath neither been well judg'd of, nor well inquired , for the Good 

 of Fruition, or (as it is commonly call'd^ the dignity and commen- 

 dation of delightful Good, is placed either in the sincerity of the Frui- 

 tion^ Of in the quicknefs and vigor of it 5 whereof the one is fuper- 

 induced by Equality 3 the other by Variety and Vicijfitude : the one 

 having a left mixture of £2/7/5 the other a more ftrong and lively 

 impreffion of Good. But of thefe, whether is the greater Good , is a 

 queftion controverted ; But whether a man's nature may be cay able of 

 both at once, is a queliion not inquired. 



§ As touching that whereof a Queftion is rais'd.-a ControverGe be- 

 gan to be debated between Socrates and a Sophi^ 5 Socrates affirm'd. 

 That Felicity was placed in a coniiant Peace aud Tranquility of mind j pi^j^ ■ 

 but the Sophijl in this. That a mandejire much and enjoy much. And Gorg. 

 fo they fell from Arguments to ill words 5 the SophiB faying that 

 Socrates s Felicity was the Felicity of a blocks orjione : Socrates on the 

 Other fide , That the Sophift's Felicity was the Felicity of one that had 

 the Itch, who did nothing but itch andfcratch. And both thefe opini- 

 ons do not want their fupportsj for to Socrates' s opinion affents even 

 the School of EpicHrHS,wh\ch deems not but that Vertue beareth a 

 great part in Felicity 5 and if fo. Certain it is, that Vertue hath more 

 ufe in clearing Perturbations, than in compajfing dcfires. The Sophijl' s 

 opinion is much favour'd by the allertion we laft fpake of, namely 

 thatG^ff^ PerfeHive is greater than Good Prefervative, becaufe the ob- 

 taining of things de((red,Jeems by degrees toperfeB nature j which though 

 it do not do it indeed, yet the very motion itfelfin circle hath a flicw of 

 Progrejfive Motion. 



But the fecond Qiieftion, (whether humane nature may not ai once 

 retaine, both the tranquility of mind, andthea&ive vigor of fruition.) 

 decided, the true way makes the former idle and fuperfluous. For do 

 we not often fee that feme men are fo fram'd and compofed by Na- 

 ture, as they are extremely affefted with pleafures while they are 

 prefent ; and yet are not greatly troubled at the leaving or \a& of 

 them. So as the Philofophical confequence, Non uti, ut non appetas, 

 non appctercjit non metuas, feems to be the refolution of a poor and 

 diffident fpirit. Surely moft of the Doctrines of Philofophers feem to 

 be fomewhat more fearful and cautionary, than the nature of things 

 requireth ; as when they encreafe the fear of death by curing it : for 

 when they would have a man's whole life to be but a difcipline or 

 preparation to dye, how can it be, that that enemy fhould not feem 



F f 2 wonderful 



