PARTS OF ANIMALS 



be arranged in a series in a definite order, so that the 

 possession of any one of them implies the possession 

 of all those which precede it in the list : 



(1) nutritive Soul in all plants 



(2) sentient Soul in all animals 



(3) appetitive Soul V . , 

 /a( λ 4.• c 1 i 111 some animals 



(4) locomotive boul J 



(5) rational Soul in man only 



At 641 a 23 Aristotle speaks of " parts " of the 

 Soul, and though he often uses this phrase, the 

 description he prefers is " faculties." In the passage 

 which follows (641 a 33 foil.) all except appetitive 

 Soul are mentioned. Sentient Soul is mentioned 

 again at 650 b 24, 667 b 23, 672 b 16. 



Aristotle raises the question whether it is the 

 business of Natural science to deal with Soul in its 

 entirety, and concludes that it is not necessary, since 

 man is the only animal in Avhich rational Soul is 

 found. Thus it is only some part or parts of Soul, 

 and not Soul in its entirety, which constitute animal 

 nature. 



In the passage 641 a 14 following, Aristotle takes 

 for granted his doctrine about Soul, which is as 

 folloAvs (De anhna. Book II.). Animate bodies, bodies 

 " Avith Soul in them " (έ'/χι/τχα), are " concrete sub- 

 stances " made up of matter and form. In this 

 partnership, of course, the body is the matter and the 

 Soul is the form. Thus Soul may be described as the 

 " form " or " realization " (kvTe\k\em, " actuality ") 

 of the animal (cf. De part., loc. cit.). 



This statement, however, is elsewhere made more 

 precise. It is possible to distinguish tivo " realiza- 

 tions " of an animal ; for an animal " has Soul in it " 



Β 2 35 



