MOVEMENT OF ANIMALS, vi.-vii. 



gression should be the last thing to happen in things 

 that are moved, since the animal is moved and walks 

 from desire or purpose, when some alteration has been 

 caused as the result of sensation or imagination. 



VII, But why is it that thought sometimes results 

 in action and sometimes does not, sometimes in 

 movement and sometimes not ? Apparently the 

 same kind of thing happens as when one thinks and 

 forms an inference about immovable objects." But 

 in the latter case, the end is speculation (for when you 

 have conceived the tΛvo premisses, you immediately 

 conceive and infer the conclusion) ; but in the former 

 case the conclusion drawTi from the two premisses 

 becomes the action. For example, when you conceive 

 that every man ought to walk and you yourself are a 

 man, you immediately walk ; or if you conceive that 

 on a particular occasion no man ought to walk, and 

 you yourself are a man, you immediately remain at 

 rest. In both instances action follows unless there is 

 some hindrance or compulsion. Again, I ought to 

 create a good, and a house is a good, I immediately 

 create a house. Again, I need a covering, and a 

 cloak is a covering, I need a cloak. What I need I 

 ought to make ; I need a cloak, I ought to make 

 a cloak. And the conclusion " I ought to make a 

 cloak " is an action. The action results from the 

 beginning of the train of thought. If there is to be 

 a cloak, such and such a thing is necessary, if this 

 thing then something else ; and one immediately 

 acts accordingly. That the action is the conclusion is 

 quite clear ; but the premisses which lead to the doing 

 of something are of two kinds, through the good and 

 through the possible. 



And as those sometimes do who are eliciting con- 



461 



