Architecture in the Animal Kingdom. 141 



clusively to the instructive association of sense-repre- 

 sentations. We have shown this in our first chapter, 

 where we discussed the wars that take place in the 

 animal kingdom, and pointed to the fact that apes are 

 unable to invent the simplest weapons and implements 

 even. The same holds good as to the use of fire. Tf 

 a troop of apes in the forest hits upon the remnants 

 of a fire lighted by the hands of man, they will cer- 

 tainly gather around it and enjoy the comfortable 

 warmth. But it has never, hitherto, occurred to any 

 ape to supply it with fuel.^ And yet it would be such 

 a simple and natural combination of representations, 

 requiring but a low degree of intelligence. Why do 

 apes, in spite of the *'high plasticity" of their quasi- 

 human brain, never hit upon such a simple means? 

 Because they possess no spiritual soul and therefore no 

 intelligence. The "plastic neurozymic activities" of 

 the simian brain are essentially different from human 

 intelligence; like those of ants and all lower animals 

 they prove to be functions of mere sensitive instinct. 

 It is wrong, therefore, to describe ants as instinctive 

 automatons, in order to safeguard the intelligence of 

 the higher animals. The psychic actions of all animals 

 are due to automatism, as far as they are unable to 

 attain the level of reasonable reflection and free self- 

 determination. For the rest, however, there is no 

 question of automatism either with lower or with 

 higher animals, because it is sensitive cognition and not 

 mere reflex activity, which prompts them to act. It 

 is true, that instinctive actions have a certain auto- 



*) Cf. Tylor (in Ranke, "Der Mensch," II, 1st ed., 436) and 

 Charles E, v. Baer (in Stoelzle, "Karl E. v. Baer und seine Weltan- 

 schauung," pp. 304, 31^). 



