n THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND 79 



with his classification of those mental states among 

 the primary uncompounded materials of conscious- 

 ness. 



If Hume's "impressions of reflection" are 

 excluded from among the primary elements of 

 consciousness, nothing is left but the impres- 

 sions afforded by the five senses, with pleasure 

 and pain. Putting aside the muscular sense, 

 which had not come into view in Hume's time, 

 the questions arise whether these are all the 

 simple undecomposable materials of thought? 

 or whether others exist of which Hume takes no 

 cognizance? 



Kant answered the latter question in the 

 affirmative, in the " Kritik der reinen Vernunf t," 

 and thereby made one of the greatest advances 

 ever effected in philosophy; though it must be 

 confessed that the German philosopher's exposi- 

 tion of his views is so perplexed in style, so 

 burdened with the weight of a cumbrous and 

 uncouth scholasticism, that it is easy to confound 

 the unessential parts of his system with those 



says : " According as our idea of ourselves is more or less 

 advantageous we feel either of these opposite affections, 

 and are elated by pride or dejected with humility . . . 

 when self enters not into the consideration there is no 

 room either for pride or humility." That is, pride is 

 pleasure, and humility is pain, associated with certain con- 

 ceptions of one's self ; or as Spinoza puts it : " Superbia 

 est de se prae amore sui plus justo sentire" ("amor" being 

 " laetitia concomitante idea causae extern ") ; and"Humi- 

 litas est tristitia orta ex eo quod homo suam impotentiam 

 sive imbecillitatem conteinplatur." 



