82 HUME n 



the slightest resemblance to the other impressions, 

 they are, in a manner, generated by them. In 

 fact, we may regard them as a kind of impressions 

 of impressions; or as the sensations of an inner 

 sense, which takes cognizance of the materials 

 furnished to it by the outer senses. 



Hume failed as completely as his predecessors 

 had done to recognise the elementary character of 

 impressions of relation; and, when he discusses 

 relations, he falls into a chaos of confusion and 

 self-contradiction. 



In the " Treatise," for example, (Book I., iv.) 

 resemblance, contiguity in time and space, and 

 cause and effect, are said to be the " uniting 

 principles among ideas," "the bond of union" 

 or "associating quality by which one idea 

 naturally introduces another." Hume affirms 

 that 



" These qualities produce an association among ideas, 

 and upon the appearance of one idea naturally introduce 

 another." They are " the principles of union or cohesion 

 among our simple ideas, and, in the imagination, supply 

 the place of that inseparable connection by which they are 

 united in our memory. Here is a kind of attraction, which, 

 in the mental world, will be found to have as extraordinary 

 effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and 

 as various forms. Its effects are everywhere conspicuous '; 

 but, as to its causes they are mostly unknown, and must be 

 resolved into original qualities of human nature, which I 

 pretend not to explain." (I. p. 29.) 



And at the end of this section Hume goes on 

 to say 



