84 HUME n 



of reminding his readers, there is nothing in ideas 

 save copies of impressions, the qualities of re- 

 semblance, contiguity, and so on, in the idea, must 

 have existed in the impression of which that idea 

 is a copy; and therefore they must be either 

 sensations or emotions from both of which 

 classes they are excluded. 



In fact, in one place, Hume himself has an 

 insight into the real nature of relations. Speaking 

 of equality, in the sense of a relation of quantity, 

 he says 



" Since equality is a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, 

 a property in the figures themselves, but arises merely from 

 the comparison which the mind makes between them." 

 (I. p. 70.) 



That is to say, when two impressions of 

 equal figures are present, there arises in the 

 mind a tertium quid, which is the perception 

 of equality. On his own principles, Hume 

 should therefore have placed this " perception " 

 among the ideas of reflection. However, as we 

 have seen, he expressly excludes everything 

 but the emotions and the passions from this 

 group. 



It is necessary therefore to amend Hume's 

 primary "geography of the mind" by the exci- 

 sion of one territory and the addition of another; 

 and the elementary states of consciousness under 

 consideration will stand thus: 



