86 HUME ii 



It really matters very little in what sense terms 

 are used, so long as the same meaning is always 

 rigidly attached to them; and, therefore, it is 

 hardly worth while to quarrel with this generally 

 accepted, though very arbitrary, limitation of the 

 signification of "knowledge." But, on. the face of 

 the matter, it is not obvious why the; impression 

 we call a relation should have a better claim to 

 the title of knowledge, than that which we: call a 

 sensation or an emotion; and the restriction has 

 this unfortunate result, that it excludes all the 

 most intense states of consciousness from any claim 

 to the title of " knowledge." 



For example, on this view, pain, so violent and 

 absorbing as to exclude all other forms of con- 

 sciousness, is not knowledge; but becomes a part of 

 knowledge the moment we think of it in relation to 

 another pain, or to some other mental phenome- 

 non. Surely this is somewhat inconvenient, for 

 there is only a verbal difference between having a 

 sensation and knowing one has it: they are simply 

 two phrases for the same mental state. 



But the " pure metaphysicians " make great 

 capital out of the ambiguity. For, starting with 

 the assumption that all knowledge is the per- 

 ception of relations, and finding themselves like 

 mere common-sense folks, very much disposed to 

 call sensation knowledge, they at once gratify that 

 disposition and save their consistency, by declar- 

 ing that even the simplest act of sensation con- 



