90 HUME in 



same footing with the pain that arises from steel, and 

 pleasure that proceeds from a fire ; and that the difference 

 betwixt them is founded neither on perception nor reason, 

 but on the imagination. For as they are confessed to be, 

 both of them, nothing but perceptions arising from the 

 particular configurations and motions of the parts of the 

 body, wherein possibly can their difference consist ? Upon 

 the whole then, we may conclude that, as far as the senses 

 are judges all perceptions are the same in the manner of 

 their existence." (I. pp. 250, 251.) 



The last words of this passage are as much 

 Berkeley's as Hume's. But, instead of following 

 Berkeley in his deductions from the position thus 

 laid down, Hume, as the preceding citation 

 shows, fully adopted the conclusion to which all 

 that we know of physiological physiology tends, 

 that the origin of the elements of consciousness, 

 no less than that of all its other states, is to be 

 sought in bodily changes, the seat of which can 

 only be placed in the brain. And, as Locke had 

 already done with less effect, he states and refutes 

 the arguments commonly brought against the 

 possibility of a causal connection between the 

 modes of motion of the cerebral substance and 

 states of consciousness, with great clearness: 



"From these hypotheses concerning the substance and 

 local conjunction of our perceptions we may pass to another, 

 which is more intelligible than the former, and more im- 

 portant than the latter, viz., concerning the cause of our 

 perceptions. Matter and motion, 'tis commonly said in the 

 schools, however varied, are still matter and motion, and 

 produce only a difference in the position and situation of 

 objects. Divide a body as often as you please, 'tis still 



