102 HUME m 



truth, which has its seat in the mind (pens6e\ and is called 

 a common notion or an axiom. Similarly, when we affirm 

 that it is impossible that one and the same thing should 

 exist and not exist at the same time ; that that which has 

 been created should not have been created ; that he who 

 thinks must exist while he thinks ; and a number of other 

 like propositions; these are only truths, and not things 

 which exist outside our thoughts. And there is such a 

 number of these that it would be wearisome to enumerate 

 them: nor is it necessary to do so, because we cannot 

 fail to know them when the occasion of thinking about 

 them presents itself, and we are not blinded by any preju- 

 dices." 



It would appear that Locke was not more 

 familiar with Descartes' writings than Hume 

 seems to have been; for, viewed in relation to 

 the passages just cited, the arguments adduced in 

 his famous polemic against innate ideas are totally 

 irrelevant. 



It has been shown that Hume practically, if 

 not in so many words, admits the justice of 

 Descartes' assertion that, strictly speaking, sensa- 

 tions are innate; that is to say, that they are the 

 product of the reaction of the organ of the mind 

 on the stimulus of an " unknown cause," which is 

 Descartes' "je ne sais quoi." Therefore, the 

 difference between Descartes' opinion and that of 

 Hume resolves itself into this: Given sensation- 

 experiences, can all the contents of consciousness 

 be derived from the collocation and metamorphosis 

 of these experiences? Or, are new elements of 

 consciousness, products of an innate potentiality 



