in THE ORIGIN OF THE IMPRESSIONS 103 



distinct from sensibility added to these? Hume 

 affirms the former position, Descartes the latter. 

 If the analysis of the phenomena of consciousness 

 given in the preceding pages is correct, Hume is 

 in error; while the father of modern philosophy 

 had a truer insight, though he overstated the case. 

 For want of sufficiently searching psychological 

 investigations, Descartes was led to suppose that 

 innumerable ideas, the evolution of which in the 

 course of experience can be demonstrated, were di- 

 rect or innate products of the thinking faculty. 



As has been already pointed out, it is the great 

 merit of Kant that he started afresh on the track 

 indicated by Descartes, and steadily upheld the 

 doctrine of the existence of elements of conscious- 

 ness, which are neither sense-experiences nor any 

 modifications of them. We may demur to the ex- 

 pression that space and time are forms of sensory 

 intuition; but it imperfectly represents the great 

 fact that co-existence and succession are mental 

 phenomena not given in the mere sense ex- 

 perience.* 



* " Wir konnen uns keinen Gegenstand denken, ohne 

 durch Kategorien; wir kSnnen keinen gedachten Gegen- 

 stand erkennen, ohne durch Anschauungen, die jenen Be- 

 griffen entsprechen. Nun sind alle unsere Anschauungen 

 sinnlich, und diese Erkenntniss, so fern der Gegenstand 

 derselben gegeben ist, ist empirisch. Empirische Erkennt- 

 niss aber ist Erfahrung. Folglich ist uns kerne Erkenntniss 

 a priori mOglich, als lediglich von Gegenstanden moglicher 

 Erfahrung." 



" Aber diese Erkenntniss, die bloss auf GegenstSnde der 

 Erfahrung eingeschrankt ist, ist darum nicht alle von der 

 Erfahrung entlehnt, sondern was sowohl die reinen An- 



