v THE MENTAL PHENOMENA OF ANIMALS 129 



main the same as the vulgar, and are governed by the same 

 maxims. Nature must have provided some other principle, 

 of more ready and more general use and application ; nor 

 can an operation of such immense consequence in life as that 

 of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the uncertain 

 process of reasoning and argumentation. Were this doubt- 

 ful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question 

 with regard to the brute creation ; and the conclusion being 

 once firmly established in the one, we have a strong pre- 

 sumption from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be 

 universally admitted, without any exception or reserve. It 

 is custom alone which engages animals, from every object 

 that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant, and 

 carries their imagination from the appearance of the one to 

 conceive the other, in that particular manner which we de- 

 nominate belief. No other explication can be given of this 

 operation in all the higher as well as lower classes of sen- 

 sitive beings which fall under our notice and observation." 

 (IV. pp. 122-4.) 



It will be observed that Hume appears to 

 contrast the "inference of the animal" with the 

 " process of argument or reasoning in man." But 

 it would be a complete misapprehension of his 

 intention, if we were to suppose, that he thereby 

 means to imply that there is any real difference 

 between the two processes. The "inference of 

 the animal" is a potential belief of expectation; 

 the process of argument, or reasoning in man is 

 based upon potential beliefs of expectation, which 

 are formed in the man exactly in the same way as 

 in the animal. But, in men endowed with speech 

 the mental state which constitutes the potential 

 belief is represented by a verbal proposition, and 



