TI CONCERNING NECESSARY TRUTHS 143 



appears to be amply sufficient to confer upon them 

 all the universality and necessity which they 

 actually possess. 



Whatever needless admissions Hume may have 

 made respecting other necessary truths he is quite 

 clear about the axiom of causation, " That what- 

 ever event has a beginning must have a cause;" 

 whether and in what sense it is a necessary truth; 

 and, that question being decided, whence it is 

 derived. 



With respect to the first question, Hume denies 

 that it is a necessary truth, in the sense that 

 we are unable to conceive the contrary. The 

 evidence by which he supports this conclusion in 

 the " Inquiry," however, is not strictly relevant 

 to the issue. 



" No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear _ 

 to the senses, either the cause which produced it, or the ef- 

 fects which will arise from it ; nor can our reason, unassisted 

 by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real ex- 

 istence and matter of fact." (IV. p. 35.) \ 



Abundant illustrations are given of this asser- 

 tion, which indeed cannot be seriously doubted; 

 but it does not follow that, because we are totally 

 unable to say what cause preceded, or what effect 

 will succeed, any e^ent, we do not necessarily sup- 

 pose that the event had a cause and will be suc- 

 ceeded by an effect. The scientific investigator 

 who notes a new phenomenon may be utterly 



