viii THEISM; EVOLUTION OF THEOLOGY 177 



If the only demonstrative argument for the 

 existence of a Deity, which Hume advances, thus 

 literally, " goes to water " in the solvent of his 

 philosophy, the reasoning from the evidence of 

 design does not fare much better. If Hume really 

 knew of any valid reply to Philo's arguments in 

 the following passages of the " Dialogues," he has 

 dealt unfairly by the reader in concealing it: 



" But because I know you are not much swayed by 

 names and authorities, I shall endeavour to show you, a 

 little more distinctly, the inconveniences of that Anthropo- 

 morphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove 

 that there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to 

 be formed in the Divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, 

 differently arranged, in the same manner as an architect 

 forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to 

 execute. 



" It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this sup- 

 position, whether we judge the matter by Reason or by Ex- 

 perience. We are still obliged to mount higher in order to 

 find the cause of this cause, which you had assigned as satis- 

 factory and conclusive. 



" If Reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from in- 

 quiries d priori) be not alike mute with regard to all ques- 

 tions concerning cause and effect, this sentence at least it 

 will venture to pronounce : That a mental world, or uni- 

 verse of ideas, requires a cause as much as does a material 

 world or universe of objects ; and, if similar in its arrange- 

 ment, must require a similar cause. For what is there in 

 this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion 

 or inference ! In an abstract view they are entirely alike ; 

 and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is not 

 common to both of them. 



" Again, when we will needs force Experience to pro- 



