210 HUME ix 



we can get no further than the conclusion of 

 Kant: 



*' After we have satisfied ourselves of the vanity of all 

 the ambitious attempts of reason to fly beyond the bounds 

 of experience, enough remains of practical value to content 

 us. It is true that no one may boast that he knows that 

 God and a future life exist ; for, if he possesses such knowl- 

 edge, he is just the man for whom I have long been seek- 

 ing. All knowledge (touching an object of mere reason) 

 can be communicated, and therefore I might hope to see 

 my own knowledge increased to this prodigious extent, by 

 his instruction. No ; our conviction in these matters is not 

 logical, but moral certainty ; and, inasmuch as it rests upon 

 subjective grounds (of moral disposition) I must not even 

 say : it is morally certain that there is a God, and so on ; 

 but, / am morally certain, and so on. That is to say : the 

 belief in a God and in another world is so interwoven with 

 my moral nature, that the former can no more vanish, than 

 the latter can ever be torn from me. 



" The only point to be remarked here is that this act of 

 faith of the intellect ( Vernunftglaube) assumes the exist- 

 ence of moral dispositions. If we leave them aside, and 

 suppose a mind quite indifferent to moral laws, the inquiry 

 started by reason becomes merely a subject for speculation ; 

 and [the conclusion attained] may then indeed be sup- 

 ported by strong arguments from analogy, but not by such 

 as are competent to overcome persistent scepticism. 



" There is no one, however, who can fail to be inter- 

 ested in these questions. For. although he may be excluded 

 from moral influences by the want of a good disposition, 

 yet, even in this case, enough remains to lead him to fear 

 a divine existence and a future state. To this end, no 

 more is necessary than that he can at least have no cer- 

 tainty that there is no such being, and no future life ; for, 

 to make this conclusion demonstratively certain, he must 

 be able to prove the impossibility of both ; and this assur- 



