xi THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 235 



The moral obligation of justice and the rights 

 of property are by no means diminished by this 

 exposure of the purely utilitarian basis on which 

 they rest: 



" For what stronger foundation can be desired or con- 

 ceived for any duty, than to observe that human society, or 

 even human nature, could not subsist without the establish- 

 ment of it, and will still arrive at greater degrees of happi- 

 ness and perfection, the more inviolable the regard is which 

 is paid to that duty ? 



" The dilemma seems obvious : As justice evidently tends 

 to promote public utility, and to support civil society, the 

 sentiment of justice is either derived from our reflecting on 

 that tendency, or, like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, 

 resentment, love of life, attachment to offspring, and other 

 passions, arises from a simple original instinct in the human 

 heart, which nature has implanted for like salutary pur- 

 poses. If the latter be the case, it follows that property, 

 which is the object of justice, is also distinguished by a 

 simple original instinct, and is not ascertained by any 

 argument or reflection. But who is there that ever heard 

 of such an instinct ? Or is this a subject in which new dis- 

 coveries can be made ? We may as well expect to discover 

 in the body new senses which had before escaped the ob- 

 servation of all mankind." (IV. pp. 273-4.) 



The restriction of the object of justice to prop- 

 erty, in this passage, is singular. Pleasure and 

 pain can hardly be included under the term prop- 

 erty, and yet justice surely deals largely with the 

 withholding of the former, or the infliction of the 

 latter, by men on one another. If a man bars 

 another from a pleasure which he would otherwise 

 enjoy, or actively hurts him without good reason, 

 the latter is said to be injured as much as if his 



