254 THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 



at the absurdity of the phraseology. In fact, it is 

 utterly impossible to conceive pain except as a 

 state of consciousness. 



Hence, so far as pain is concerned, it is suffi- 

 ciently obvious that Berkeley's phraseology is 

 strictly applicable to our power of conceiving its 

 existence " its being is to be perceived or 

 known," and " so long as it is not actually per- 

 ceived by me, or does not exist in my mind, or 

 that of any other created spirit, it must either 

 have no existence at all, or else subsist in the 

 mind of some eternal spirit." 



So much for pain. Now let us consider an 

 ordinary sensation. Let the point of the pin be 

 gently rested upon the skin, and I become aware 

 of a feeling, or condition of consciousness, quite 

 different from the former the sensation of what 

 I call " touch." Nevertheless this touch is plainly 

 just as much in myself as the pain was. I cannot 

 for a moment conceive this something which I 

 call touch as existing apart from myself, or a 

 being capable of the same feelings as myself. 

 And the same reasoning applies to all the other 

 simple sensations. A moment's reflection is suffi- 

 cient to convince one that the smell, and the 

 taste, and the yellowness, of which we become 

 aware when an orange is smelt, tasted, and seen, 

 are as completely states of our consciousness as is 

 the pain which arises if the orange happens to be 

 too sour. Nor is it less clear that every sound is 



