256 THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION, 



the sensation of warmth, does at a nearer ap- 

 proach produce in us the far different sensation of 

 pain, ought to bethink himself what reason he 

 has to say that his idea of warmth, which was 

 produced in him by the^re, is actually in the 

 fire; and his idea of pain which the same fire 

 produced in him in the same way, is not in the 

 fire. Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, 

 and pain not, when it produces the one and the 

 other idea in us; and can do neither but by the 

 bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid 

 parts? " * 



Thus far then materialists and idealists are 

 agreed. Locke and Berkeley, and all logical 

 thinkers who have succeeded them, are of one 

 mind about secondary qualities their being is to 

 be perceived or known their materiality is, in 

 strictness, a spirituality. 



But Locke draws a great distinction between 

 the secondary qualities of matter, and certain 

 others which he terms " primary qualities." These 

 are extension, figure, solidity, motion and rest, 

 and number; and he is as clear that these 

 primary qualities exist independently of the mind, 

 as he is that the secondary qualities have no such 

 existence. 



" The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the 

 parts of fire and snow are really in them, whether any one's 

 senses perceive them or not, and therefore they may be 



* Locke, Human Understanding, Book II. chap. viii. 

 14,15. 



