THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 259 



pricking the nerve stump will appear to be seated 

 in the fingers, just as if they were still connected 

 with the body. 



It is perfectly obvious, therefore, that the 

 localization of the pain at the surface of the body 

 is an act of the mind. It is an extradition of 

 that consciousness, which has its seat in the 

 brain, to a definite point of the body which 

 takes place without our volition, and may give 

 rise to ideas which are contrary to fact. We 

 might call this extradition of consciousness a 

 reflex feeling, just as we speak of a movement 

 which is excited apart from, or contrary to, our 

 volition, as a reflex motion. Locality is no more 

 in the pin than pain is; of the former, as of the 

 latter, it is true that "its being is to be per- 

 ceived," and that its existence apart from a think- 

 ing mind is not conceivable. 



The foregoing reasoning will be in no way 

 affected, if, instead of pricking the finger, the 

 point of the pin rests gently against it, so as to 

 give rise merely to a tactile sensation. The 

 tactile sensation is referred outwards to the point 

 touched, and seems to exist there. But it is 

 certain that it is not and cannot be there really, 

 because the brain is the sole seat of consciousness; 

 and, further, because evidence, as strong as that 

 in favour of the sensation being in the finger, can 

 be brought forward in support of propositions 

 which are manifestly absurd. For example, the 

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