THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 265 



'if that freedom to move is really another name 

 for the feeling of unopposed effort, accompanied 

 by that of change of place, it is surely impossible 

 to conceive of such space as having existence apart 

 from that which is conscious of effort. 



But it may be said that we derive our concep- 

 tion of space of three dimensions not only from 

 touch, but from vision; that if we do not feel 

 things actually outside us, at any 'rate we see 

 them. And it was exactly this difficulty which 

 presented itself to Berkeley at the outset of his 

 speculations. He met it, with characteristic bold- 

 ness, by denying that we do see things outside us; 

 and, with no less characteristic ingenuity, by de- 

 vising that " New Theory of Vision " which has 

 met with wider acceptance than any of his views, 

 though it has been the subject of continual con- 

 troversies.* 



In the " Principles of Human Knowledge," 

 Berkeley himself tells us how he was led to those 

 opinions which he published in the " Essay to- 

 wards the New Theory of Vision." 



" It will be objected that we see things actually without, 

 or at a distance from us, and which consequently do not 

 exist in the mind ; it being absurd that those things which 



* I have not specifically alluded to the writings of 

 Bailey, Mill, Abbott, and others, on this vexed question, not 

 because I have failed to study them carefully, but because 

 this is not a convenient occasion for controversial discussion. 

 Tho e who are acquainted with the subject, however, will 

 observe that the view I have taken agrees substantially with 

 that of Mr. Bailey. 



