268 THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 



reader of the " New Theory of Vision " ? As, for 

 example: 



" It is, I think, agreed by all, that distance of itself, and 

 immediately, cannot be seen." 2. 



" Space or distance, we have shown, is no otherwise the 

 object of sight than of hearing." 130. 



" Distance is in its own nature imperceptible, and yet 

 it is perceived by sight. It remains, therefore, that it is 

 brought into view by means of some other idea, that is itself 

 immediately perceived in the act of vision." 11. 



" Distance or external space." 155. 



The explanation is quite simple, and lies in the 

 fact that Berkeley uses the word " distance " in 

 three senses. Sometimes he employs it to denote 

 visible distance, and then he restricts it to distance 

 in two dimensions, or simple extension. Some- 

 times he means tangible distance in two dimen- 

 sions; but most commonly he intends to signify 

 tangible distance in the third dimension. And it 

 is in this sense that he employs " distance " as the 

 equivalent of " space." Distance in two dimen- 

 sions is, for Berkeley, not space, but extension. 

 By taking a pencil and interpolating the words 

 "visible" and "tangible" before "distance" 

 wherever the context renders them necessary, 

 Berkeley's statements may be made perfectly con- 

 sistent; though he has not always extricated him- 

 self from the entanglement caused by his own 

 loose phraseology, which rises to a climax in the 

 last ten sections of the " Theory of Vision," in 

 which he endeavours to prove that a pure intelli- 



