iv DESCARTES' DISCOURSE ON METHOD 177 



consideration will show this formula to be full of 

 snares and verbal entanglements. In the first 

 place, the "therefore" has no business there. 

 The " I am " is assumed in the " I think," which 

 is simply another way of saying " I am thinking." 

 And, in the second place, " I think " is not one 

 simple proposition, but three distinct assertions 

 rolled into one. The first of these is, " something 

 called I exists ; " the second is, " something called 

 thought exists ; " and the third is, " the thought is 

 the result of the action of the I." 



Now, it will be obvious to you, that the only 

 one of these three propositions which can stand the 

 Cartesian test of certainty is the second. It can- 

 not be doubted, for the very doubt is an existent 

 thought. But the first and third, whether true or 

 not, may be doubted, and have been doubted. 

 For the assertor may be asked, How do you know 

 that thought is not self-existent ; or that a given 

 thought is not the effect of its antecedent thought, 

 or of some external power ? And a diversity of 

 other questions, much more easily put than 

 answered. Descartes, determined as he was to 

 strip off all the garments which the intellect 

 weaves for itself, forgot this gossamer shirt of the 

 " self " ; to the great detriment, and indeed ruin, 

 of his toilet when he began to clothe himself 

 again. 



But it is beside my purpose to dwell upon the 

 minor peculiarities of the Cartesian philosophy. 



VOL. i, N 



