218 ANIMAL AUTOMATISM v 



others are discoverable), and then it will easily be seen, that all 

 the actions of beasts are similar only to those which we perform 

 without the help of our minds. For which reason we shall lx> 

 ft ireed to conclude, that we know of the existence in them of no 

 other principle of motion than the disposition of their organs 

 and the continual affluence of animal spirits produced by the 

 heat of the heart, which attenuates and subtilises the blood ; and, 

 at the same time, we shall acknowledge that we have had no 

 reason for assuming any other principle, except that, not having 

 distinguished these two principles of motion, and seeing that 

 the one, which depends only on the animal spirits and the 

 organs, exists in beasts as well as in us, we have hastily con- 

 cluded that the other, which depends on mind and on thought, 

 was also possessed by them." 



Descartes' line of argument is perfectly clear. 

 He starts from reflex action in man, from the 

 unquestionable fact that, in ourselves, co-ordinate, 

 purposive, actions may take place, without the 

 intervention of consciousness or volition, or even 

 contrary to the latter. As actions of a certain 

 degree of complexity are brought about by mere 

 mechanism, why may not actions of still greater 

 complexity be the result of a more refined 

 mechanism ? What proof is there that brut* 

 other than a superior race of marionettes, which 

 eat without pleasure, cry without pain, desire 

 nothing, know nothing, and only simulate 

 intelligence as a bee simulates a mathema- 

 tician ? l 



The Port Royalists adopted the hypothesis that 



1 Malebranrhe states the view taken by orthodox Cartesians in 

 1689 very forcibly: "Ainsi dans les eliiens, les dials, et les 

 autivs aiiiinanx, il n'y a ny intelligence, ny uiue spirituellc 

 comme 011 1'euteud ordiiiairemcnt. Us maugcnt sans plaisir ; ils. 



