236 ANIMAL AUTOMATISM y 



the retention or the impression of these ideas on the memory ; 

 the internal movements of the appetites and the passions ; and 

 lastly the external movements of all the limbs, which follow so 

 aptly, as well the action of the objects which are presented to 

 the senses, as the impressions which meet in the memory, that 

 they imitate as nearly as possible those of a real man ; I desire, 

 I say, that you should consider that these functions in the 

 machine naturally proceed from the mere arrangement of its 

 organs, neither more nor less than do the movements of a clock, 

 or other automaton, from that of its weights and its wheels ; so 

 that, so far as these are concerned, it is not necessary to con- 

 ceive any other vegetative or sensitive soul, nor any other 

 principle of motion or of life, than the blood and the spirits 

 agitated by the fire which burns continually in the heart, and 

 which is no wise essentially different from all the fires which 

 exist in inanimate bodies. " 



And would Descartes not have been justified in 

 asking why we need deny that animals are 

 machines, when men, in a state of unconsciousness, 

 perform, mechanically, actions as complicated and 

 as seemingly rational as those of any animals ? 



But though I do not think that Descartes' 

 hypothesis can be positively refuted, I am not dis- 

 posed to accept it. The doctrine of continuity is 

 too well established for it to be permissible to me 

 to suppose that any complex natural phenomenon 

 comes into existence suddenly, and without being 

 preceded by simpler modifications; and very 

 strong arguments would be needed to prove that 

 such complex phenomena as those of conscious- 

 ness, first make their appearance in man. AYe 

 know, that, in the individual man, consciousness 

 grows from a dim glimmer to its full light, whether 



